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The catastrophe from the 11th of March 2011 (earthqua-
ke, tsunami, nuclear disaster) hit the Japanese economy 
at a point when industrial production was appearing to 
recover. All of the monetary and fiscal stabilization mea-
sures taken were unsuccessful in establishing a perma-
nent growth course following the international finan-
cial crisis. In the last quarter of 2010, economic perfor-
mance was again declining.1 This downward trend was 
exacerbated by the disaster. In the first quarter of 2011, 
the gross domestic product shrank by 3.5 percent.
Industrial production fell drastically as an immediate 
consequence of the natural disaster. Thus in March of 
2011, the strongest monthly decline since 1953 was re-
corded at minus 15.5%. Significant bottlenecks occur-
red in the country’s power supply as a result of the di-
saster in Fukushima. Entire regions were disconnected 
from the power grid at hourly intervals. 
In addition there was the significant disruption in the 
supply chains, which, due to the just-in-time production, 
could have a particularly rapid and sustained impact on 
key economic sectors such as the automotive industry or 
semiconductor manufacturing.2 Due to the focus on sin-
gle Japanese manufacturers and the few locations in the 
earthquake zone, production had to be reduced or shut 
down entirely in these sectors, at least temporarily.
1  The Japanese economy has only slowly recovered from the effects of the 
international financial crisis of 2008/2009.  Although the gross domestic 
product grew by 4% in 2010, the weak domestic demand contributed to a 
renewed decline in the total economic output already in the 4th quarter of 
2010. Also see Ferdinand Fichtner and others: Sommergrundlinien 2011. 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin No. 26+27/2011.
2  A small vendor part, which measures the air supply for car engines, will ap-
parently be a problem for the global automotive industry due to supply 
shortages caused by the production downtimes in Japan. The earthquake and 
the subsequent tsunami in mid-March have already led to cutbacks in 
production or plans to do so in some plants from General Motors, Toyota Motor 
and PSA Peugeot Citroen. Manufacturers fear supply shortages of such 
individual critical parts that are produced in Japan, reports the Thursday 
edition of “The Wall Street Journal.” Klaus Brune: JAPAN / supply shortages 
hamper production - reduced working hours threaten. Dow Jones Newswire, 
Message dated 24 March 2011.
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The natural and nuclear disaster on the 11th of March 2011 pulled 
Japan into a renewed recession. Projected on the annual basis, the 
gross domestic product nosedived by 3.5% in the first quarter of 
2011. 
Indeed the consequences of the earthquake, tsunami and subsequent 
nuclear disaster will be very noticeable for the remainder of the year 
with regard to economic development. However, initial signs of a 
rebound have begun to appear in the meantime. Extensive public 
spending programs are currently sustaining the demand. Prior to the 
earthquake, the public debt was already approximately 200% of the 
gross domestic product and was rising rapidly. The government must 
harmonize duties, responsibilities and financial conditions; otherwi-
se its room to maneuver in times of more “extreme events” decrea-
ses. Thus the Japanese government faces a dilemma: Increasing the 
tax burden, which is low when compared internationally, will have a 
negative impact on economic development. Fiscal consolidation and 
debt-financed economic growth are contradictory.17 DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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Despite the dramatic events, a positive growth rate (alt-
hough slight) has already been reported in April for the 
industrial production. Such a rebound effect is typically 
following disasters.3
The positive trend was reinforced in May of 2011. How-
ever, industrial production remains about five percent 
below the respective comparison value from the pre-
vious year.4 Meanwhile, survey indicators, such as the 
Tankan index, are suggesting that the economic mood 
is brightening.
Japan: Export-driven growth ...
Japan is using a strategy similar to Germany’s: The 
overall economic development is strongly influenced 
by foreign demand and therefore by exports. Domestic 
demand has only grown slightly in recent years. Up 
until the late 1980’s, Japan was still the future leading 
economic power ahead of the United States of Ameri-
ca.5 Since the collapse of its housing bubble in the ear-
ly 1990’s, Japan has not found its way back to its old 
growth dynamic.
In 2008/2009, Japan also fell into the wake of the inter-
national financial crisis. The country, such as Germany, 
is a major net creditor on the international capital mar-
ket. Just like Germany, Japan reported had large current 
account surpluses for years.6 More is produced than is 
invested and consumed by the domestic economy.7 In 
2010, the current account surplus amounted to just over 
three percent of the gross domestic product.
Similar to Germany, the country could first recover re-
latively quickly from the effects of the international fi-
nancial crisis, not least due to massive fiscal programs, 
a continuous policy of cheap money and high overall 
economic dynamism of the Asian “emerging econo-
mies.” However, dwindling exports in the fourth quar-
ter of 2010 demonstrated the fragility of the growth - the 
gross domestic product caved immediately.
3  M. Shirakawa (2011): Great Eastern Japan Earthquake: Resilience of 
Society and Determination to Rebuild, Remarks of the Council of Foreign 
Relations. New York, April 2011. E. Cavallo und I. Noy (2010): The Economics of 
Natural Disasters: A Survey. IDB Working Paper Series, No. 124.
4  www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/iip/result/pdf/press/h2a1005j.pdf.
5  Ezra Vogel: Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. iUniverse.com, 
1979, San Jose, New York, Lincoln, Shanghai.
6  Andreas Rees, Markus Taube, Bernd Kempa and Georg Erber: USA, China, 
Indien: Droht ein globaler Abwertungswettlauf? In: Ifo-Schnelldienst, 2010, Vol. 
63, No. 22, 3–17.
7  Since the fall of 2010, the Japanese yen has depreciated by approximately 
two percentage points as compared to the currencies of its major trading 
partners (measured by the real exchange rate).
After the earthquake, the current account surplus dec-
lined and in April 2011 did not even reach one third of 
the previous year’s comparison value. This trend conti-
nued in May. However, the balance of current accounts 
remained positive even during these difficult months, 
which is primarily due to the repatriation of Japanese 
foreign assets. The trade balance was in the deficit in 
both months. Overall, Japan’s export quota, at nearly 
14% in 2010, is far below that of Germany’s. The Japa-
nese import quota reached approximately 11%. The limi-
ted openness of the Japanese economy, as compared to 
Germany’s, contributed to the fact that the consequen-
ces of the natural disaster as a whole had a negligible 
impact on international markets. In particular, it is evi-
dent in other economies (despite the existing tight value 
chains) that hardly any lasting loss of production there 
occurred.8 However, it remains to be seen whether or not 
the de-stocking of critical parts from Japan in individual 
areas presents delayed consequences. Currently Japan is 
the sixth largest trading partner of the EU. Last year, the 
EU exported goods and services to Japan amounting to 
nearly 44 billion euro. Germany was the leading parti-
cipant with 13 billion euro. Imports amounted to 65 bil-
lion euro. While the export demand for Japan’s econo-
mic development is of vital importance, Japan’s impor-
tance in all international trade is likely to decline. Thus 
in 2010, China replaced Japan from its position as the 
second largest economy in the world. Currently, there 
is much evidence that Japan’s global economic impor-
tance will continue to decline in the future.9
… weakening domestic demand
The demand from the private sector has been weak for 
years (table 1). Politico-economic impulses always only 
lead to a short-term stimulation. This applies both for 
private consumption as well as for investments. There-
fore, after the economic stimulus package for handling 
the financial crisis expired, a renewed decline of the pri-
8  “For the time being, the earthquake disaster and the nuclear accidents in 
Japan are not causing supply shortages for high-tech equipment in Germany.” 
The Bitkom inter-trade organization stated this on Wednesday in Berlin. 
According to the manufacturers’ first reports, the direct impact of the 
earthquake and tsunami on the production of high-tech products was limited. 
“Companies are striving to bring production back up to full speed or they are 
relocating production capacities to other plants,” said Bitkom president 
August-Wilhelm Scheer. www.wallstreet-online.de/nachricht/3118186-erdbe-
ben-bitkom-keine-lieferengpaesse-bei-hightech-durch-japan-katastrophe.
9  Simply considering the proportion of an economy in global production 
falls far too short of being able to estimate their productivity and competitive 
position. This is especially true if a country is confronted with massive 
demographic changes. Since the Japanese government hardly allows 
immigration from abroad, the aging of the Japanese population penetrates the 
Japanese job market. In addition, fertility is low by OECD standards. At the 
same time, life expectancy is above the OECD average. Traditionally, the 
unemployment rate in Japan is low by OECD standards. It is currently at five 
percent.DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011 18
JAPAn At thE cRossRoADs— stAtE BuDGEt REmAIns thE AchIllEs’ hEEl
vate demand was assumed. Now, the immediate conse-
quences of the disaster continue to dampen the demand. 
Thus, consumer spending in March declined nationally 
by nearly eleven percent.10
Compared internationally, Japan has shown a propen-
sity to consume comparatively little, which is accompa-
nied by a high overall saving rate. Deflation (which is 
still to be sustainably overcome) played a role on expen-
ditures both in private households as well as in compa-
nies.11 Falling prices increase the incentive to delay the 
purchase of durable and more expensive goods further 
into the future. With deflation, the interest on borro-
wings (such as for credit financing of investments) is 
subject to an additional risk. The nominal interest rate 
is fixed at the time when the contract is signed, but the 
real interest rate may be higher if the prices fall. From 
the perspective of companies, the risk of investment 
thus increases.12
10  Here, the consumption of households with two or more persons was 
registered. Bank of Japan (2011): Consumption.
11  Related to the complete basket of goods, an inflation of zero percent is 
shown for the 1st quarter 2011. Not considering the price development for 
fresh foods, Japan has been in a new ongoing deflation since 2009. Bank of 
Japan (2011): Commodity and Service Prices.
12  The most recently declining investments (1st quarter 2011: -5.2 percent) in 
Japan can thus also be seen as connected with the fragile export development.
Despite all monetary and fiscal policy endeavors in re-
cent years, this deflation-consumption downward spi-
ral has yet to be  broken in Japan.13 So far, the expansio-
nary monetary policy measures seem to mainly fall flat. 
A significant portion of the liquidity has been transfer-
red abroad through “carry trades.”14
The purchase of securities by the Japanese Central Re-
serve Bank was facilitated as a part of the crisis manage-
ment following the earthquake.15 It is positive that the 
banking system was apparently hardly shaken by the 
consequences of the earthquake. Adhering to the po-
licy of easy money should support the financing of re-
construction in the affected coastal region. However, the 
expansionary impulses that may be caused by interest 
rate policies are largely exhausted. The prime rate has 
long been close to zero percent. Monetary policies can 
therefore only assume impulses through an ever more 
generous provision of liquidity. If monetary policy mea-
sures have only limited effect, then the traditional eco-
nomic policy for economic stimulation must primarily 
rely on fiscal policy.16
crisis management through fiscal policy
An additional fiscal program of the magnitude of 0.8% 
of the gross domestic product was approved immediately 
following the disaster from the 11th of March 2011. Ac-
cording to preliminary estimates by the Japanese govern-
ment, the costs to overcome the disaster will amount to 
208 billion euro.
It remains to be seen whether the long-lasting costs for 
redressing the nuclear disaster in Fukushima are alrea-
dy considered in a sufficient amount. The fiscal costs 
of reconstruction in the next several years are estima-
ted by the International Monetary Fund (IWF) to be 
approximately two to four percent of the gross dome-
stic product.17
13  Mechthild Schrooten (2001): Japan: Zinsschritt reicht nicht aus. 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin No. 8/2001.
14  Currency carry trade is a speculative strategy where a speculator borrows 
money in a currency with a relatively low interest rate in order to buy debt 
securities, which are quoted with a higher interest rate in another currency (e.g. 
U.S. government bonds). Profits arise from the difference in interest rates.
15  Immediately following the earthquake, the Japanese Central Reserve Bank 
considerably increased the framework in which securities of all types can be 
bought out and at the same time made available an additional line of credit in 
the order of one billion yen.
16  The national demand was in a supporting role, even in the current 
downturn (as is so often the case with a fading economy). (1st quarter 2011: + 
9.2 percent). Cabinet Office (2011): quarterly Estimates of GDP: Jan.–Mar. 2011 
(The 2nd Preliminary Estimates). www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/ sokuhou/kekka/
gaiyou/main_1.pdf.
17  IMF (2011): Article 4 Consultations.
Table 1
Economic situation in Japan
Change from the previous year in percent
2008 2009 2010 2011 1
Gross domestic product  –1.2 –6.3 4.0 –0.9
Private consumption  –0.7 –1.9 1.8 –1.1
Asset investments  –1.4 16.7 2.1 –1.3
Public investments  –8.6 10.4 –3.4 –1.4
Export  1.6 –23.9 23.9 0.7
Import  0.4 –15.3 9.8 1.9
Consumer prices  1.4 –1.4 –0.7 0.32
Unemployment rate in percent 3.9 5.0 5.0 4.53
1  1. Quarter 2011 compared with the previous quarter. 
2  June 2011 compared with the previous month. 
3  May 2011.
Sources: Cabinet Office, Statistics Bureau, Bank of Japan.
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After recovering from the financial crisis, the economy is decreasing 
again due to the natural disaster.19 DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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not even reach the threshold of 10 percent of the gross 
domestic product. Therefore if (as a part of a crisis con-
fidence regarding the credit rating of Japanese public 
finances) the average interest rate were increased from 
1.5 percent  to 2.5 percent  for the long term, it would re-
sult in doubling the revenue needed for handling the in-
terest payments from the previously accumulated pub-
lic debt. Japan would then need to consolidate public fi-
The Japanese government budgets have been chroni-
cally in deficit for years. Negative consequences must 
be expected for economic growth with a national debt of 
more than 90% of the gross domestic product.18 Japan 
has long been on the other side of this limit and continu-
es to move further away from it. Japan’s chronic growth 
weakness could be part of its cause. The private capital 
investments have turned out very low for years and pu-
blic infrastructure investments cannot compensate for 
this in terms of economic growth. Japanese multinati-
onal companies would rather invest abroad.
In the 2011 fiscal year, nearly 48 percent of the expen-
ditures were not financed by taxes and levies. This cor-
responds to a deficit ratio of approximately 10 percent. 
The debt increased by 17 trillion yen just in the time pe-
riod immediately following the earthquake (from March 
to April 2011, illustration 1). At first glance, financing 
by way of public debt  is attractive in Japan, because the 
central bank’s interest rate policy, combined with the 
policy of easy money, appears to secure cost-effective fi-
nancing. Actually the burdening of the state budget by 
the debt service has so far only slowly increased. This is 
due to the extremely low nominal interest rate on Japa-
nese government bonds of approximately 1% for ten-ye-
ar government bonds and 2% for maturities between 20 
and 40 years.19 Therefore, a significant increase in inte-
rest rates due to a confidence crisis could dramatically 
change the situation in Japan. In order to prevent this, 
the government is attempting to convert short-term fi-
nancing to longer-term financing (illustration 2). Howe-
ver, it could be difficult to find buyers on the market with 
the current low interest rate. As a result of the many ye-
ars of underfunding of the state, the public debt incre-
ased to over 200% of the gross domestic product20—by 
this is on top of all other OECD countries.
If there were an average annual interest rate of 1.5 per-
cent for the national debt, then approximately 3 percent 
of the gross domestic product would have to be collec-
ted annually from the Japanese government only for in-
terest payments.
In doing so, government expenditure is not particularly 
high compared to international standards. Rather, in the 
2011 fiscal year, it was nearly 20 percent of the gross do-
mestic product. The revenue from taxes and levies does 
18  Carmen M. Reinhardt und Kenneth E. Rogoff (2008): This Time is 
Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises. NBER-Wor-
king Paper, April 2008.
19  Ministry of Finance of Japan: quarterly Newsletter. April 2011.
20  In April 2011, debts amounted to 942.3 trillion yen (approx. eight trillion 
euro) and thus approx. five percent up on the comparable figure of the prior 
year. Compare Bank of Japan (2011): National Government Debt.
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Public debt is ever increasing while new borrowing reached alarming proportions.
Figure 2
maturities of Japanese Government Bonds
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The extension of maturities would secure long-term low interest payments.DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011 20
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nances under adverse framework conditions similar to 
those currently in the European crisis countries. Dras-
tic spending cuts would be inevitable.
The history of prior development is primarily that of 
low tax rates and tax revenues compared to internatio-
nal standards. For example, the sales tax rate is 5%. The 
income tax burden is also low compared to international 
standards. Tax relief programs were implemented here 
as a part of the past fiscal programs. Previously, the sta-
bilization of the economy, social security and recurring 
fiscal programs have been offered to the private sector 
in Japan are far below the actual costs and virtually at 
no cost. Consequently, redistribution from the state to 
the private sector has taken place here for years. The le-
gal framework conditions (e.g. for the public pension 
fund, but also for insurance  funds) in turn oblige the 
private sector to hold significant amounts of government 
bonds. Thus, in recent years the private sector has esta-
blished significant claims against the state, for which it 
even receives interest payments (albeit low).21
21  The companies are currently in much more debt than at the time of the 
economic crisis of the 1990’s.
At the same time, the tax burden on the private sector is 
low by international standards. Foreign creditors have 
so far played no significant role in the credit financing 
of public budgets in Japan. Domestic creditors hold ap-
proximately 95 percent of the government securities 
(illustration 3). From the perspective of foreign inves-
tors, Japanese securities are hardly attractive, not least 
with a view to the low interest rates (by international 
standards) and the risks associated with a high public 
debt. In particular, the high proportion of government 
bonds held by domestic pension funds could become 
a problem due to the demographic change of a quickly 
aging Japanese society. Finally, always increasing pay-
outs from the assets of pension and life insurance must 
be made in growing amounts. The low yields on Japa-
nese government bonds hardly suffice in being able to 
service merely the corresponding claims from the cur-
rent interest income. Japan is increasingly viewed more 
critically by international rating agencies. An examp-
le is the development of the credit rating by Fitch, one 
of the three major rating agencies (table 2).22  This me-
ans that Japan’s country rating is only two levels (A and 
BBB) above the critical threshold of the junk bond ra-
ting (BB and below). However, the Japanese rating agen-
cy Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) continues to rate 
Japan with AAA.23 It is therefore reasonable to suspect 
that JCR is allowing a home bias in their assessment. 
So far, the credit rating downgrades by international ra-
ting agencies have had no effect on the interest rate of 
Japanese government bonds.24 In particular, the worse-
ned rating has thus far not led to a deterioration of fi-
nancial conditions for the Japanese state, but that could 
change for Japan as a part of the financial markets be-
coming very sensitive to higher public debt (such as in 
Italy’s case recently). The ever-changing weak govern-
ments also have little hope for a rapid shift to compre-
hensive structural reforms.
threatening debt trap
The Japanese government has recognized25 that finan-
cing significant portions of public responsibilities via 
loans cannot go on forever without curtailing too much 
the government’s future ability to act in extreme situa-
22  Message of Bloomberg News dated 28th of May 2011: Japan Risks Rating 
as Kan Fumbles Fiscal Plan.
23  JCR: JCR affirmed AAA (FC/LC) rating on Japan. Press release dated 22th 
September of 2010.
24  Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s reasons for their decisions were that 
the country’s economic and financial policies did not prove to be stringent 
enough to achieve the goals set by the government to reduce the deficit. The 
mountain of debt threatens to continue to grow, even though it is already 
significantly higher than in comparable countries.
25  Cabinet Office (2010): Fiscal Management Strategy. www.npu.go.jp/
policy/policy01/pdf/20100706/20100706_fiscalmanagement.pdf.
Figure 3
owner Groups of Japanese Government Bonds
Shares in percent
Foreigners
Households
Others
Pension fund
Public pensions
Life insurances
Banks1
Japanese Central Bank
4.8
4.5
3.2
3.9
10.3
20.2
45.1
8.0
1  In particular also Japan Post Bank.
Source: MoF Japan, April 2011.
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tions. Precisely because natural disasters must always 
be expected in the country, the government’s ability to 
act also serves to restore confidence and thus stabilize 
the expectations of the population. In fact, the govern-
ment has decided to cut the primary deficit of the pub-
lic budgets in half by 2015.
Tax increases are currently being discussed. Formally, 
increasing the sales tax rate (which is at 5%) offers a st-
arting point.26 The IMF suggests a gradual increase to 
15%. With regard to the widespread reluctance in con-
sumer spending, such a tax hike, however, could be fa-
tal for the overall economic development in Japan. In 
the past, the domestic demand completely collapsed fol-
lowing a relatively minor sales tax increase from 3 per-
cent to 5percent. This led simultaneously to a political 
crisis. A Japanese government would only very reluc-
tantly desire to take such a risk again. 
conclusion
The first signs of recovery after the disaster are appea-
ring in Japan. Currently, a more pronounced economic 
recovery is beginning to show up due to the renewed de-
ficit-financed government demand. However, different 
long-term and short-term development trends are over-
laying another. The earthquake from March of 2011 and 
its consequences have further intensified the already pre-
vailing structural problems. The Japanese government 
has faced the challenge of introducing steps for budget 
consolidation without jeopardizing the country’s econo-
mic development nine years. So far they have been un-
successful in finding a way out of this dilemma. Up un-
til now, the government still benefits froms favorable fi-
nancing conditions to deal with the rising public debt. 
This could turn out to be a fatal debt trap if the situa-
tion in the financial markets change unfavorably. It is 
therefore now also important to strengthen the revenue 
aspect of the public budgets. The problem is known. If 
its solution of problems is postponed future costs might 
increase significantly accordingly.
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26  Given the background of the relatively low sales tax rate, the International 
Monetary Fund, for example, suggests a gradual increase to 15%. The IMF is 
also assuming a dampening effect on private consumption. Currently, the sales 
tax revenue is approximately 2.5% of the gross domestic product. In Germany, 
the sales tax revenue is 7.5% of the gross domestic product with the tax rate of 
19 or 7%. In Japan’s case, the tax revenue is expected to double by increasing 
the tax rate to 15%.
Article first published as “Japan am Scheideweg - Staatshaushalt bleibt die 
Achillesferse”, in: DIW Wochenbericht Nr. 31/2011.
Table 2
fitch-Ratings for Japan
In foreign currency In national currency
long-term  short-term  outlook/watch short-term  outlook/watch
27 May 2011 AA F1+
Rating Watch 
negative AA–
Rating Watch 
negativ
9 May 2005 AA F1+ stable AA– stable
21 November 2002 AA F1+ negative AA– negative
26 November 2001 AA F1+ negative AA negative
2 March 2001 AA+ F1+ negative AA+ negative
21 September 2000 AA+ F1+ stable AA+ stable
29 June 2000 AA+ F1+ – AA+ –
21 September 1998 AA+ F1+ – AAA –
1 September 1998 AAA F1+
Rating Watch 
negative AAA
Rating Watch 
negative
26 October 1995 AAA F1+ – AAA –
10 August 1994 AAA – – – –
Comments: Negative rating actions are in bold.
Source: Fitch, version: May 2011.
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According to the Fitch rating agency, Japan's credit rating is declining steadily.DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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